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Abstract
This paper offers an analysis of the illiberal practices and discourse of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) and demonstrates how the
United States of America used the liberal argument as a qualitative metric of its success and failure in the GWoT. I argue that ‘the
othering’ of Salafi Jihadists as well the full military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq were both philosophically rooted in the liberal
thinking of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, which have traditionally guided US foreign policy. More significantly, these liberal
philosophies of history and international relations hold within them the seeds of illiberalism by depicting non-liberal, undemocratic
societies/organisations as ‘barbaric’ – and as such prime candidates for intervention and regime change. Predicated upon this logic,
the discourse of the GWoT framed Al Qaeda as a key existential threat to not only the United States but also the ‘civilised world’ in
general and one which required a ‘liberal defensive war’ in response. It was the successful securitisation of Al Qaeda that essentially
enabled the United States to adopt deeply illiberal policies to counter this so-called existential threat by using any means at its dis-
posal.
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I. Introduction1
When George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and the Amer-
ican nation in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, perhaps no one could
have predicted that the following decade would see the scale of intervention that
followed in Afghanistan and Iraq, with concomitantly high levels of not only ci-
vilian deaths but also the unintended security fallouts that are more than evident
in the Middle East today. More significantly, perhaps no one could have pre-
dicted the deeply illiberal policies and practices that would be adopted by the
United States (US) in order to address the threat of Al Qaeda and its allies.
These practices seen, amongst others, in cases such as the Abu Ghraib scandal,
the Guantanamo Bay prison camp, the use of targeted assassinations and ex-
traordinary renditions, not only bring into question the very essence of liberal
values that the United States purports to uphold but also engender a deeper
questioning of the relevance of liberalism in today’s world.
In this article, I undertake an analysis of the neoconservative discourse and
practice of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) as evidenced through statements
made by George W. Bush and other key members of his administration. This
analysis demonstrates how the United States of America, under the Bush ad-
ministrations, has used what is in essence a liberal argument as a qualitative
metric of its success and failure in the GWoT. I argue that the foundation for
‘the othering’ of Salafi Jihadists as well as the identification of specific geo-
graphical locales for full military intervention (Afghanistan and Iraq) are both
based in the liberal states’ construction of an argument that depicts these societ-
ies/agents/organisations as undemocratic, barbaric, backward and illiberal – in
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other words, as prime candidates for armed intervention and regime change.
Predicated upon this logic, the administrations of President George W. Bush,
successfully framed Salafi-Jihadism as a key existential threat to not only the
United States but also the ‘civilised’ liberal world order. Having successfully
securitised the Al Qaeda brand of Salafi-Jihadism, the United States under the
Bush administrations then framed itself as the guardian and upholder of demo-
cratic values seeking to preserve a liberal way of life in the face of what was an
unprecedented threat. However, somewhat paradoxically, this was achieved
through the adoption of deeply illiberal practices that have encouraged some to
question the very foundations of both the American nation and the liberal world
order.
In this article I argue that these deeply illiberal practices and policies can
trace their roots to a long-standing tradition of liberalism and more particularly
to the thinking of philosophers like Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. To this
end, I first outline the basis tenets of liberalism and liberal internationalism as
used in this paper before outlining how the seeds of illiberalism can be located
in the historical writings of Kant and Mill2. Having provided this context, I then
identify how US foreign policy, at the very least from the 20th century onwards,
has not only championed intervention for democracy promotion but also how it
has framed such intervention as a key national security imperative. This back-
ground will serve to contextualise the GWoT and highlight how it does not nec-
essarily represent a sharp break from the policies adopted by previous US
administrations – although it does admittedly signify a shift from the more be-
nign liberalism of the 1990s. Once this theoretical and historical foundation has
been laid, I will proceed to illustrate how the United States under the Bush ad-
ministration deliberately securitised Al Qaeda by framing 9/11 as an excep-
tional act and used it to justify the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The
deliberate construction of this discourse will be then be illustrated through a the-
matic analysis of key communications from the Bush administrations, most par-
ticularly the Presidential State of Union addresses and US National Security
Strategies.
II. Tracing the illiberal roots of Liberalism
The liberal euphoria that surfaced in the Western world in the early 1990s
following the defeat of Soviet communist ideology has in recent times given
way to exaggerated claims of a decline and defeat of the liberal international or-
der in the early twentieth century. Much of this disillusionment can be credited
to the recent global financial crisis, the rise of non-liberal powers and illiberal
ideologies as well as the GWoT as it has unfolded since the horrific attacks of 11
September 2001. While the 9/11 attacks mobilised the United States into com-
mencing a global fight against terrorism they also marked the adoption of
deeply illiberal policies by a country that had been known for its long-standing
liberal tradition. Over the past fourteen years these policies have not only en-
gendered one of the most serious civil liberties crises within the United States
but brought into question its commitment to the basic liberal values of individ-
ual rights at the international level as well.
Various scholars have suggested, either implicitly or explicitly, that the
seeds of US illiberalism lie in its deep-rooted liberal tradition and that the
neo-conservatives share more than a passing resemblance with so-called liberal
‘purists’3 However, before I probe this link and given the ‘varieties of liberal-
ism’ (Doyle 1997), it is useful to begin by stating exactly what liberalism means
in the context of this article. Liberalism refers to a political system or a set of po-
litical values based on the legal equality of citizens, political representativeness,
individual freedom and laissez faire. In essence, it is grounded in the belief that
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the promotion of freedom is inextricably linked to peace in that governments
that respect individual liberty are more likely to exercise restraint and have
peaceful intentions in their foreign policies (idem). Founded on this logic, lib-
eral internationalism has created a structure of international cooperation based
on shared norms which have come to include a respect for human rights, non-in-
tervention, anti-imperialism, free markets, political and religious tolerance as
well a toleration of differing ideas as to what constitutes a good life (Grey 2004;
Williams 2006). However, this definition belies the heavy-handed US response
to the 9/11 attacks and its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nonetheless, while this
understanding of liberalism seemingly cannot explain the excesses that have
characterised US foreign policy in the recent past, a closer look at Immanuel
Kant’s ideas in his influential essay Perpetual Peace (1797) certainly sheds
some light upon how deeply illiberal policies may be adopted by a liberal state.
Michael Desch argues that Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’ has exerted the great-
est influence on U.S. foreign policy primarily through the theory of ‘democratic
peace’ and it is in his work that the very roots of ‘liberalism’s illiberalism’ can
be located (Desch 2007)4. Those who adhere to this argument predicate it on the
logic that Kant’s thesis has provided the “philosophical rationale for efforts to
promote peace through the spread of democracy under the auspices of interna-
tional institutions such as Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations” (idem,
p. 12)5. It is certainly true that over the past century or so, liberal international-
ism has come to encompass both a Wilsonian-like belief in the liberal state’s
moral duty to establish peace and liberty through the active spread of democ-
racy as well as (in some circles) a belief that it is, in fact, in the liberal state’s
strategic interest to do so. It has, therefore, been argued6 that liberal states have
overcome their distaste for external armed interventions in pursuit of this moral
duty and in doing so have extended liberal values to peoples and places where
they did not previously exist.
The philosophical roots of this argument may be traced to Kant’s objective
of establishing perpetual peace without the need for an overarching world gov-
ernment that was embodied in the first of his definitive articles, which states
that: “nations should be republics and the constitution will be based on the civil
rights of individuals within that state” (Williams 2006, p. 25)7. But for such a
system to be effective it was imperative that all countries have the same republi-
can domestic political order. Kant’s reasoning is grounded in the belief that po-
litical systems where individuals, who more often than not tend to be directly
impacted by the cost of wars, also have a say in whether it is waged are less
likely to engage in this harmful activity (Desch 2007, p. 12). Hence, as Kant ar-
gues in the first definitive article, republics where citizens’ opinions are re-
flected tend to be less inclined to engage in wars (Doyle 1996). In short, a
perpetual peace can only be guaranteed only if all parties to it are liberal, ‘demo-
cratic’ states because only then will there be conditions established to not only
facilitate a cessation of all hostilities but “an end to all hostilities” and therefore
the end “of all existing reasons for future war”(my emphasis) (George 2000).
Desch therefore points out that, unlike earlier social contract theorists like
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, Kant saw the state of nature as so treacherous
that its dangers could only be mitigated by a radical transformation of both a
country’s internal domestic order as well as the international system. But more
crucially for the purpose of this thesis, Kant conferred republican states with the
right to bring to an end to the international state of war through the use of force
against other states in order to compel them to embrace republicanism. He thus
explains how, “for the sake of its own security, each nation can and should de-
mand that others nations enter into a contract resembling the civil one and guar-
anteeing the rights of each” (Kant 1983, p. 116). In other words, the pacific
union of liberal states” (Desch 2007, p. 13; Doyle 1986, p. 1160)8, which engen-
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7 See also Brown (1992),
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(1983).
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ders a society of states where the civil constitution of every nation is republican
and thus guarantees the rights of each nation in the international system. Thus,
Kant, arguably the greatest of the liberal internationalist, makes a fairly water-
tight case for the use of illiberal means including force, coercion and interven-
tion to bring about change in the international system and in doing so marks a
fundamental departure from classical international law with its unqualified
commitment to state sovereignty9.
Desch goes on to clarify that while Kant’s advocacy of forcible conversion
to republicanism seems to contradict his fifth preliminary article which categor-
ically forbids intervention in the domestic politics of other countries this is, in
fact, not the case. This is because for liberals, “state sovereignty ultimately de-
rives from the rights of individuals in the state of nature. When individuals sur-
render their natural liberty to the commonwealth through the social contract,
then it inheres in the state” (Desch 2007, pp. 13-14). While intervention in the
domestic affairs of such a representative states violates the individual rights of
its citizens, a state which is not representative does not enjoy the same rights of
non-intervention10. This is framed in Kant’s idea of the ‘unjust enemy’ that he
conceptualises in Metaphysics of Morals (1798), and which is defined as “one
whose publicly expressed Will, either in word or deed, betrays a maxim which,
if it were taken as a universal rule, would make a state of peace among the na-
tions impossible, and would necessarily perpetuate the state of nature” (Jahn
2005b, p. 14). An unjust enemy is one that refuses to adopt republicanism and in
doing so threatens the pacific federation. In other words, non-republican states
threaten the historical evolution towards the “end-state of a law ruled interna-
tional society [and] as a consequence, not only the international community of
states but each state is entitled to apply ‘all means’ [...] against this dangerous
opponent” (Müller 2014, p. 479). This is how war remains a legitimate “instru-
ment of statecraft in relation to authoritarian regimes” (Dunne 2009, p. 108).
A final key point that needs be made is how Kant’s thesis allows a republi-
can hegemon to actively promote the establishment of the republican league by
inspiring other states to adopt a republican political order both domestically and
in the international system (Doyle 1996; Desch 2007). Kant, therefore, pro-
motes the idea that a gradual expansion of the foedus pacificum is necessary for
the establishment of perpetual peace. Proponents of the democratic peace have
seen this Kantian logic as the philosophical justification for active democracy
promotion in the international system. Beate Jahn argues that while the issue of
consent is never really discussed by democratic peace theorists, it is a central
concern for not only liberal thought in general but also the democratic peace
thesis in particular. Given that liberal institutions derive their legitimacy from
consent, presumably the absence of consent denies non-liberal states of this
very legitimacy. Logically, Jahn argues, this implies that citizens of non-liberal
states would consent to liberal institutions, and yet they do not. This is possibly
the result of various external and internal barriers, that may range from “politi-
cal repression, or non-liberal cultural traditions [...] [to] simply a lack of expo-
sure to the benefits of liberal life” (Jahn 2005b, p. 182). However, proponents of
the democratic peace thesis, by founding themselves on logic of an expanding
foedus pacificum, tend towards “interventionism irrespective of consent” (ibi-
dem). In short, despite the presence of key tensions, by viewing the existence of
non-liberal states as a threat to perpetual peace and the sustainable longevity of
the pacific union, Kantian liberalism potentially provides the philosophical jus-
tification for the use of illiberal means of intervention, hegemony, coercive re-
gime change and democracy promotion, thus illuminating the deeply illiberal
roots of liberalism11.
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III. Mill and the Logic of the Barbarian Other
If Kantian liberalism provides the philosophical grounding for intervention
then John Stuart Mill’s liberalism provides even further justification for spread-
ing liberal values to ‘barbarian’ societies, which lack them in order to bolster the
liberal project by expanding the pacific federation. Mill’s theory, in stark con-
trast to early liberal philosophers like Adam Smith, Edmund Burke and Jeremy
Bentham, is in essence a defence of colonial imperialism and a ‘civilising des-
potism’ (Pitts 2005). Jennifer Pitts calls this the “liberal turn to empire” and ar-
gues that it was “accompanied by the eclipse of nuanced and pluralist theories of
progress as they gave way to more contemptuous notions of ‘backwardness’
and a cruder dichotomy between barbarity and civilisation” (idem, pp. 2-3). In-
deed it is in this dichotomy that J. S. Mill’s philosophy of history most closely
resembles contemporary liberal thought and fully reconciles the colonial impe-
rial project with what are the core tenants of contemporary liberalism – in what
Beate Jahn calls a ‘perfect match’12. Thus, Mill deploys the language of civilisa-
tion, savagery and barbarism to outline his view of the world and the stages in
the development of history and to essentially justify imperialism and the colo-
nial enterprise13. From these stages of history, he identifies modern civilisation
as the highest form and claims that it embodies what were (by this time) the fa-
miliar liberal characteristics of “commerce, manufacture, agriculture, coopera-
tion, social intercourse, law, justice, the protection of both individuals and
property and in ideal cases, the existence of a representative government” (Jahn
2005b, p. 194)14.
Mill frames civilisation as the direct opposite of barbarism – indeed as Jahn
so fittingly states, as the very “negation of barbarism” (Jahn 2005a). Framed in
this manner, barbarians are a threat, the proverbial ‘other’ and everything that
modern civilisation is not: infantile, incapable of ‘self-government’ (Pitts 2005,
p. 5). violent and irrational. Mill’s thought therefore makes an inherent distinc-
tion between a culturally superior and a culturally inferior peoples (idem, p.
605), on the basis of which he argues that one set of rules must exist for relations
between civilised nations and an entirely other set for those between civilised
and barbarian nations. “[N]one but civilised nations have ever been capable of
forming an alliance (Mill 1990, p. 49) because alliances require reciprocity,
which barbarians are incapable of. As such, “they [i.e. barbarian nations] cannot
be depended on for observing any rules” (Mill 1984, p. 118). Mill therefore con-
structs the relationship between civilised nations as necessarily governed by
laws of equality where aggressive wars and intervention is non-existent and un-
necessary. However, these ideas of equality and relations based in liberal princi-
ples only applied amongst civilised nations15. In sharp contrast, relations
between civilised nations and barbarian people are necessarily hierarchical.
For Mill progress is critical and his focus remains unrelentingly upon “man
as a progressive being” (Mill 2005, p. 14). His construction of different stages
of history as a development from savagery to civilisation reflects both this phi-
losophy and focus. However, Mill warns, progress from one stage to the next is
by no means automatic. Indeed backward development and stagnation are real
dangers and unfortunately “among the most melancholy facts in history” (Jahn
2005a, p. 603). While on the one hand civilised nations face the dangers of
backward development and stagnation on the other, savage and barbarian peo-
ples lack the very faculties to develop and progress independently and without
the influence of a foreign, ‘civilising’ force. As such, it becomes the responsi-
bility of civilised peoples to compel the savage and barbarian nations to change
and move towards progress. As this can only be achieved through force, despo-
tism becomes the most appropriate form of rule for savages, barbarians and
semi-barbarous peoples (Jahn 2005b, p. 196). There are clear tones of what can
‘Defensive Liberal Wars’: The Global War on Terror and the Return of Illiberalism in American Foreign Policy 103
11 This is admittedly a
normative interpretation of
Kant’s Republican Peace.
However, it is worth stating
that there is a body of work
that challenges this view by
positing the predictive, rather
than the normative nature of
Kant’s work. See (Huntley
1996; MacMillan 1996;
Thompson 1996) - three works
that resulted in a ‘systemic’
research programme on the
Democratic Peace in the
2000s. I would like to thank
my anonymous reviewer for
bringing this critical point to
my attention.
12 It is worth noting here, that
I argue that it is precisely
within this tension, which
authors like Jennifer Pitts and
Beate Jahn identify as existing
between liberalism’s
commitment to human dignity
and equality on the one hand
and the support that so many
historical liberal thinkers
professed for imperial
conquest and governance on
the other, that we can locate –
to borrow Desch’s phrase –
‘liberalism’s illiberalism’.
13 Several authors, in addition
to Pitts, claim that Mill’s
liberalism is intertwined with
ideas of colonialism and
imperialism. Among others,
see for instance Jahn (2005a),
Mehta (1999), Passavant
(2002), and Souffrant (2000).
14 Mill’s ideal case is, of
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15 See also Mehta (1999).
only be categorised as condescending paternalism and ‘the white man’s burden’
in Mill’s liberal philosophy, which asserts that, “despotism is a legitimate mode
of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improve-
ment [my emphasis], and the means justified by actually effecting that end”
(Mill 2005, p. 14). In short for Mill, “barbarians have no rights as a nation, ex-
cept a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for
becoming one” (Mill as quoted in Jahn 2005a, p. 605).
Indeed, a close inspection of Mill’s philosophy of history and international
affairs makes it clear that he is an advocate of what Pitts terms as “a despotic,
but civilising, imperial rule” or a “progressive colonial despotism” (Pitts 2005,
p. 133, p. 136). Jahn outlines how Mill’s philosophy, which on the basis of es-
tablishing a clear moral and political hierarchy between civilised and barbarian
peoples, essentially makes a case against extending the rights of sovereignty
and non-intervention to barbarian nations, is clearly echoed in contemporary
liberal thought and, more significantly for this paper, in the liberal rhetoric sur-
rounding the GWoT as well. Firstly, Jahn argues, “non-liberal or ‘outlaw states’
are defined by their refusal of comply with international law” – in other words,
their refusal to reciprocate based on which they can then be “denied the right to
sovereignty and non-intervention”. Second, he argues that, “intervention is an
appropriate means to speed up the development of ‘all peoples’, who will be
‘safer and more secure’ once the sources of ‘aggressive and dangerous behav-
iour’ are removed” (Jahn 2005b, p. 197)16. In short, Mill’s philosophy makes a
fairly robust case for inequality and aggressive (if paternalistic and civilising)
intervention in the affairs of those categorised as barbarian ‘others’ in order to
further, what would in contemporary liberal thinking be categorised as, the
democratic peace. Taken together, the impact and influence exerted by the phi-
losophies and worldviews of Kant and Mill upon US politicians, domestic and
foreign policy should not be underestimated17.
IV. From ‘Offensive Liberal Wars’ of Choice to ‘Defensive Liberal Wars’ of Necessity
Having traced some of the historical philosophical influences on contempo-
rary US foreign policy, I now turn to understanding the place of the GWoT in
the broader trajectory of American behaviour in the international system. Here
it is clear that the United States has been preoccupied with establishing interna-
tional peace and stability through the promotion of liberal democracy, through
the use military force if necessary, at least since the twentieth century18. There is
little doubt that US foreign policy has been shaped by its belief in the signifi-
cance of not only adhering to liberal democratic values but also a perceived ob-
ligation to spreading these values and norms internationally. Tony Smith states
that, “the most consistent tradition in American foreign policy has been the be-
lief that the nation’s security is best protected by the expansion of democracy
worldwide” (Smith 1993, p. 9). Jonathan Monten in turn argues that the “con-
cept of the United States as agent of historical transformation and liberal change
in the international system informs almost the entire history of US foreign pol-
icy and democracy promotion is not just another foreign policy instrument or
idealist diversion; it is central to US political identity and sense of national pur-
pose” (Monten 2005, p. 113). In this regard, the GWoT may be viewed as but an
extension of what in essence has been a historical US practice of democratisa-
tion conducted to ensure both its national security and perceived survival in
what is a hierarchical and dangerous international system19.
There were various efforts in the 20th century to spread the values of liberal-
ism by exporting democracy to countries that had hitherto been ruled by dicta-
tors and authoritarian regimes. A large number of these efforts were promoted
by the United States and backed by the use of U.S. military force (Kurth 2005,
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p. 306). In fact, the 20th century began with the United States engaging in three
separate military interventions aimed at bringing democracy to the former
Spanish colonies of the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico (Kurth 2004; 2005).
More significantly, not all of these interventions were conducted without sus-
taining significant losses. For instance, the U.S. military intervention in the
Philippines from 1899-1902, with its bloody repression of the local insurgency,
not only resulted in the loss of around four thousand U.S. soldiers but also re-
sulted in the deaths of 16,000 Filipino guerrillas and as many as 200,000 civil-
ians (Kurth 2005, p. 306)20. This paternalistic trend of democracy promotion
was further strengthened by President Woodrow Wilson who first sent the U.S.
Marines into several Latin American countries in order to “teach the Latin
Americans to elect good men,” and then sent in U.S. troops into Europe stating
that the United States was going to “make the world safe for democracy” (Kurth
2005, p. 306). Indeed, as Wilson stressed, “America would spend her blood and
her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness” (Woodrow Wil-
son as quoted in Kaplan 2003, p. 22). James Kurth identifies four theatres where
the United States has used military conquest and occupation to bring about po-
litical democratization.
“(1) the Caribbean basin and Central America from the 1900s-1930s (Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua) and again from the 1960s-1990s (the
Dominican Republic and Haiti again and also Grenada and Panama); (2) Central
Europe from the 1940s-1950s (West Germany, Austria, and Italy); (3) Northeast
Asia from the 1940s-1950s (Japan and South Korea); and (4) Southeast Asia
from the 1960s-1970s (particularly South Vietnam). Together, these add up to
more than a dozen cases in which the United States has used military occupation
to bring about political democratization. They provide useful precedents and les-
sons for the [...] efforts in Iraq” (idem, pp. 306-307).
In other words, the use of military force by the United States for the cause of
democracy promotion is not a new phenomenon and, at least empirically, one
can argue that it has been a benchmark of American foreign policy in the 20th
century. It is however worth noting that that the United States has had distinctly
different approaches to fostering democracy in Europe vs. the Western Hemi-
sphere, perhaps best illustrated by US policy under President Woodrow Wilson.
For most people, it is Wilson’s European policy that was enacted “mainly
through international agreements and organisations” (Smith 1993, p. 62) that
represents what has come to be known as ‘Wilsonianism’. However, this per-
spective seems to forget the hard, militaristic, unilateral stance that the US
chose to adopt in its dealings with Latin America in their efforts to teach them to
‘elect good men’ (Desch 2007, p. 19). Wilson’s belief in America’s role in
spreading liberal values and norms is evident when he declared in 1912, “I be-
lieve that God has planted in us visions of liberty [...] that we are chosen and
prominently chosen to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall
walk in the path of liberty” (Williams 2006, p. 3). This stance is a clear illustra-
tion of how the Kantian notion of the democracy promotion and the Millean no-
tion of the ‘barbarian nation’ and a ‘hierarchical’ international system have
translated into the practices of US foreign policy.
At the same time, as mentioned above this was by no means a temporary or
passing phase of US foreign policy. Instead, the “legacy of Wilson the demo-
cratic crusader was passed down from generation to generation – from Harry
Truman, who argued that ‘totalitarian regimes undermine the foundations of in-
ternational peace and hence the security of the United States’, to John. F. Ken-
nedy – before being put to rest [I would argue with the benefit of hindsight,
temporarily] in the jungles of Vietnam” (Kaplan 2003, p. 22). By the end of the
Cold War, US armed interventions had evolved quite significantly, at least in
material terms. By this period, the use of force could be relatively controlled
thanks to the advent of precision technologies (Freedman 2006b). Freedman ar-
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20 See also Boot (2003) and
Linn (1989).
gues that the direct result of this technological evolution was that there were
fewer Western and civilian casualties than before. Even so, an inherent tension
within liberal thinking remained as an instinctive distaste for the use of military
force on part of non-interventionist liberals clashed with the interventionists’
crusader-like tendency to actively champion the cause of justice and protect the
oppressed internationally through a vigorous promotion and promulgation of
liberal norms and values (more on this below). Freedman makes a case that to
some extent this tension appeared manageable in the armed interventions of the
1990s, which were undertaken to “protect the weak, shelter the poor and feed
the hungry” (Freedman 2006a, p. 51). He argues rather eloquently, that these in-
terventions of the 1990s had less to do with Western interests than with Western
sensibilities in the face of tremendous violence and human suffering. Although
they tended to be conducted in the most part, rather reluctantly and somewhat
tentatively and they produced somewhat mixed results - in humanitarian terms
they most certainly made a difference. However, the key difficulty lay in creat-
ing stable political conditions in the wake of armed intervention that would al-
low Western forces to withdraw. In this, armed intervention proved to be a way
of “thwarting a slide into hell but not too suited to grasping heaven” (idem,
pp. 51-52).
Nonetheless, irrespective of the consequences of intervention, what is worth
noting is that, as Freedman argues, these interventions were largely ‘wars of
choice’, i.e. they were altruistic rather than necessary for the interveners. I
would argue that the same case might be made for the interventions in Latin
America and to some extent also in Vietnam. In this sense, these interventions
were ‘offensive liberal wars’, because they sought to aggressively extend liberal
values and freedoms “to places where they were [...] absent, or at least in short
supply” (ibidem). Philosophically grounded in the Kantian logic of an ever-ex-
tending pacific federation these were wars that were fought to ensure national
security, and eventually a state of ‘perpetual peace’. It is significant that these
wars tended to be waged when resources were available and tapered off when
resources became scarce – clear reflections of how these were an exercise in
‘choice’ (idem, p. 63). Furthermore, these were wars fought for justice with lit-
tle, if any, regard for context (idem, p. 65), very much in line with Mill’s philos-
ophy of protecting and accelerating the development of ‘all peoples” through
civilising, albeit aggressive and imperialistic, intervention (Jahn 2005b, p. 197).
In sharp contrast, Freedman categorises the wars fought in Afghanistan and
Iraq under the rubric of the ‘Global War on Terror’ as ‘defensive liberal wars’,
i.e. wars of necessity, fought to ensure survival, to defend and preserve the
Western way of life. He argues that “because [these interventions] were strate-
gically defensive, they took on the character of wars of necessity, [...] [where]
no semblance of defeat could be tolerated. This meant that not only were the
methods offensive, in that the war was taken into enemy territory; they were
also less restrained than the interventions of the 1990s. In both cases the objec-
tives also took on a more offensive aspect, as they came to involve an attempt to
bring the Western way of life to brutalised countries” (Freedman 2006a, p. 52).
One can argue that even these ‘offensive wars’ to some degree echoed the
Wilsonian logic by seeking not only to guarantee national security by making
‘the world safe for democracy’ but also attempting to ‘teach the Afghans and
Iraqis to elect good men’. Thus, not only was exporting liberty to the oppressed
of Afghanistan and Iraq presented as a “great moral cause” it was framed as
merely the beginning of a campaign that (much in same vein as Woodrow Wil-
son) aimed to “bring the hope of democracy [...] to every corner of the world”
(George W. Bush as quoted in Kaplan 2003, p. 21). What was different here
however was that this was now an imperative, framed as essential for the sur-
vival of the nation. As such, while these wars of necessity had to be fought irre-
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spective of resources and were criticised by opponents for the “simplistic
presentation and the exaggerated role claimed for armed forces in their prosecu-
tion” (Freedman 2006a, p. 52), they were by no means bereft of America’s tra-
ditional liberal aspirations. Thus, US armed ‘interventions’ post- 9/11 in
Afghanistan and Iraq, marked a key shift in the policies of a liberal state that had
for much of its history only undertaken offensive liberal wars of choice. The
United States, in launching the GWoT, was ostensibly defending its right to sur-
vival against illiberal regimes and ideologies that challenged its political, social
and economic principles. Somewhat paradoxically then, as per Freedman’s ar-
gument, defensive liberal wars not only needed to focus on context, they also
tended to be more aggressive/offensive in their means and aims as the stakes
were higher21. As Desch argues then, what makes the GWoT so dangerous and
impels the United States towards the use of illiberal tactics is not so much the
physical threat that transnational terrorism or Al Qaeda pose to the homeland,
but rather the existential threat they pose to the American way of life. However,
were it not for the deeply rooted liberal tradition within in the United States it
would, in all likelihood, “view the threat from global terrorism in a less alarmist
light (more akin to a chronic crime problem than to World War IV) and would
adopt more restrained policies in response (i.e. containment rather than global
transformation)” (Desch 2007, p. 8).
V. Interventionist liberals and interventionist neoconservatives: old bedfellows
Andrew Williams argues that, “what distinguishes liberal states from their
illiberal counterparts is that they [i.e. liberal states] believe quite sincerely in the
creation of a better world and that they are exemplars of what the world should
look like” (Williams 2006, p. 5). There are some differences however regarding
how this vision of creating a better world should be translated into practice, per-
haps best encapsulated in Jonathan Monten’s broad categorisation of
exemplarism and vindicationism. Monten argues that the exemplarism tradition
of US liberalism believes that democracy and liberal values can be spread by ex-
ample while the tradition of vindicationism believes that a more activist foreign
policy is necessary to accomplish this (Monten 2005)22. Put another way,
Monten essentially categorises the US liberal tradition as leaning either towards
military interventionism or non-interventionism. He also rightly asserts that
while both these approaches have coexisted in American political history, there
have certainly been times when one has been more prevalent than the other
(Pitts 2005, p. 114). Based on such a categorisation, there seems to be more than
just a passing resemblance between the neo-conservatives and the Wilsonian
(or interventionist) liberals as regards their beliefs about intervention and de-
mocratisation. This is a good basis to comprehend not only the somewhat star-
tling similarity between George W. Bush and Woodrow Wilson but also the
deeply illiberal policies adopted by both during their respective presidencies.
Many scholars have remarked upon this similarity between George W. Bush
and the neoconservatives and the liberal traditions of the United States as exem-
plified by Wilsonianism. Lawrence Kaplan wrote in 2003 that, “Bush is becom-
ing the most Wilsonian president since Wilson himself” and “the influence of
Wilsonian ideals may be gleaned in everything from the administration’s plans
to use Iraq as a pivot for democratising the Arab world to its broader strategy of
transforming rather than coexisting with totalitarian regimes” (Kaplan 2003, p.
21). Indeed, many of the views that are associated with the neoconservatives to-
day echo those of Woodrow Wilson who believed that American power could
and should be used to promote justice and democracy internationally and that by
reshaping the world, America would secure its political and security interests.
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Proponents of this view also argue that a key requirement of a Wilsonian
foreign policy is not only the desire to reshape the world and mould events, but
also a conviction that the United States possesses the power and ability to do so
– which also explains why this “Wilsonian impulse has ebbed and flowed” in
American politics and possibly also why it remerged with the neoconservatives
(Steel 2003, p. 21). But this ideological continuity is perhaps not surprising
given that the origins of neo-conservatism in the United States are liberal, lying
as they do in the response by a group of Cold War liberal democrats and demo-
cratic socialists who, in the 1970s, opposed the utopianism of antipoverty
programmes and affirmative action domestically and the policy of détente with
the Soviet Union abroad. Instead these neoconservatives, as they came to be
known, argued for a foreign policy that not only could curb the spread of com-
munism but also actively promote democracy in the international system as a
mechanism to secure United States’ economic and strategic security. However,
it is imperative to note that while it may have had reactionary liberal roots and
despite some obvious similarities with Wilsonianism, over time American
neo-conservatism has come to “embody a distinctive and somewhat coherent
set of causal and normative beliefs organised around the assertion of US mili-
tary strength, resolve and political values” (Monten 2005, pp. 142-143)23. In this
regard, and thanks to the unapologetic desire to channel US power to affect
democratic change in the international system, neo-conservatism can be firmly
situated within the long liberal tradition of ‘vindicationism’24.
Where the neoconservatives differ from traditional liberal interventionists is
in their emphasis on the centrality of US military power as the primary instru-
ment to engender liberal change and generate a ‘new world order’ – and this be-
came amply clear over the course of the GWoT25. It is because of this that
Ronald Steel argues that,
“Liberals and neoconservatives may both be correct in considering themselves
to be Wilsonians. In truth, they are more alike than they admit in their ideological
ambitions and their moral justifications [...] In practice the difference between
interventionist liberals and interventionist neoconservatives is more a matter of
degree than of principle. It rests on how much exercise of military power the lib-
erals will rationalise and how much deference to liberal clichés the neocon-
servatives will tolerate” (Steel 2003, p. 20)26.
At the same time, the transformative impulse for neo-conservatism also re-
lies upon a sincere belief in US capabilities to affect liberal change abroad,
which is in turn based upon an urgent acknowledgement of both its remarkable
post-Cold War military primacy as well as its unrivalled position of power in the
unipolar international system. Strategically then, the GWoT must also be under-
stood as an attempt by neoconservatives to use America’s position as the
world’s sole superpower to secure an unmatched position of advantage in the
international system. In other words, the GWoT represents a culmination of the
historical neoconservative call for using force to check the emergence of poten-
tial challengers to US predominance. It is worth noting that in the post-Cold
War period, the neoconservatives viewed traditional balance of power strate-
gies as both unnecessary and unsuitable for what they argued were radically dif-
ferent circumstances. It was widely acknowledged, and not solely by the
neoconservatives, that ongoing system-level changes meant that the United
States could not expect to remain the sole superpower in the world forever. This
was then America’s “unipolar moment”27 and the neoconservatives (as well as
various other US administrations, including those of George W.H. Bush and
Bill Clinton) argued that it was imperative that the United States take advantage
of its position to both preserve and extend its hegemony in the international sys-
tem. The resulting realignment in US foreign policy, most ostensibly reflected
in America’s gradual but steady shift away from multilateralism back towards a
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fully operationalised by the neoconservatives in George W. Bush’s administra-
tion28.
The (re)emergence of an aggressive interventionist policy post-9/11 with
the GWoT, can also be understood by viewing the historical evolution of Amer-
ican self-identity through the lens of ‘exceptionalism’, or the perception that the
Unites States differs “qualitatively from other developed nations, because of its
unique origins, national credo, historical evolution and distinctive political and
religious institutions” (Harold Hongju Koh as quoted in Monten 2005, p. 119).
In foreign policy terms, exceptionalism translates into a belief that “liberal val-
ues transfer readily to foreign affairs” and thus bolsters the US tendency to at-
tempt to both ‘remake’ international society and (re)assert its right to be
different by taking “individual action against threats” (Buzan 2004a). Hassner
argues that, “exceptionalism carries with it a tendency to consider that the
United States is empowered, because of the purity of its intentions and the ex-
cellence of its regime, to judge between good and evil, to award others good or
bad points, to punish the wicked and troublemakers, not to recognize any supe-
rior legal authority above that which comes from the American people them-
selves, and to consider any external inclination to cast doubt on American
intentions or to apply to it the criteria that it applies to others as an insult”
(Buzan 2004b, p. 155). Thus, inherent in exceptionalism is not only a clear no-
tion of what it means to be American but also the rights, responsibilities and
threats that come with being the United States. The fact that, threats are framed
as exceptional is crucial to understanding how the rhetoric of the GWoT not
only constructed 9/11 as exceptional but also how this notion of exceptionalism,
itself rooted in a very particular vision of the United States’ mission abroad, en-
abled a successful securitisation of Al Qaeda and transnational terrorism by the
neoconservatives.
As stated above, the discourse of the GWoT underscored the exceptional na-
ture of the USA and, in doing so, provides us with critical insights into the
United States’ particular understanding of its role, position and privileges in the
post-9/11, unipolar world. First, the discourse of the GWoT framed 9/11 as an
exceptional act and a national tragedy. America was attacked because it was
America, because it was “the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in
the world” (Bush 2001a). In constructing 9/11 as an exceptional act of violence
this discourse (re)established that, as the sole superpower, the United States not
only enjoyed the advantage of exceptional powers and privileges in the interna-
tional system but also attracted exceptional threats. As the focus of both “myr-
iad resentments and the bearer of great responsibilities” (Derian 2002, p. 103) it
was obliged to secure itself, not only because it had to but also because it
could29. Of course, as stated previously, the United States’ perceptions of threat
and insecurity were essentially rooted in not only the structural pressures gener-
ated by the post-Cold War unipolar system (Buzan 2004a) but also bolstered by
a long foreign policy tradition which believed that US national security was best
protected by the expansion of democracy. More crucially, the promotion of de-
mocracy and liberal change in the international system, as explained above, has
been a central component of American political identity. Thus when these fac-
tors combined, they not only elevated America’s perceptions of the threats it
was exposed to but also complemented elements of its exceptionalism. Thus,
America’s propensity towards hypersecuritisation i.e., its “tendency to both ex-
aggerate threats and resort to excessive countermeasures” (idem, p. 18) already
underway due to conditions of unipolarity, was further intensified by the attacks
of 9/11. To underscore once more, this hypersecuritisation was rooted very par-
ticularly in a liberal view of the world – i.e. in the notion that Al Qaeda repre-
sented an existential threat to key liberal values and freedoms in the interna-
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tional system. As a result, not only did this vision predispose the United States
towards adopting an aggressive, unilateralist response to 9/11, but the univer-
salist element of American exceptionalism also meant that it “could justify the
pursuit of its own national security not just on the basis of preserving a distinc-
tive nation [...] but also on the basis of protecting the future wellbeing and rights
of all of humankind” (idem, p. 18). As Steel so eloquently puts it, “in seeking
virtuous ends, they [i.e. the United States] embrace[ed] questionable means”.
(Steel 2003, p. 21). In short, the interplay between unipolarity and universalist
aspects of American exceptionalism enabled the United States to both claim
special rights and privileges in pursuit of its national security (Buzan 2004a,
pp. 18-20) and special (albeit illiberal) means to achieve the same. Thus, in con-
structing 9/11 as exceptional the Bush administration not only underscored the
unique and privileged status of the US but also justified illiberal policy under
the GWoT as the legitimate and necessary response of an exceptional na-
tion-state.
VI. The themes of the neoconservative GWoT discourse - in defence of liberal values and freedoms:
The securitisation of a Western way of life as exemplified by its liberal val-
ues and freedoms is clearly operationalised in the speeches and communica-
tions that emerge from the Bush administration from 2001-2008, in which Al
Qaeda’s brand of international terrorism is progressively and successfully
framed as an existential threat. Indeed, even a brief purview of the communica-
tions that emerged during this period reveal that the Bush administration’s for-
eign and security policies were essentially rooted in liberal concerns and
principles. Bush’s 2004 State of the Union address asserted that the aim of the
United States was “a democratic peace”. Similarly, the 2002 National Security
Strategy “was framed by the desire to protect and extend liberty – even includ-
ing the enigmatic goal of achieving a ‘balance of power that favours free-
dom’”30. In examining the communications produced during the Bush adminis-
trations, especially his annual State of the Union addresses, the philosophical
and political influences of Kant, Mill as well as Wilson are amply evident.
Moreover, it is also clear how this discourse deliberately a) framed Al Qaeda as
an existential threat to liberal values and freedoms and as such the Western way
of life, and b) positioned the United States as a defender of these values in the in-
ternational system. Certain key themes emerge in the securitisation rhetoric and
can be located in almost all the documents studied. Upon closer examination
these themes clearly constitute a step-by-step construction of a case for waging
a defensive liberal war, that encompassed not only preventive military action
and intervention but also had at its core the clear aim of democratising what
were seen as backward and barbaric and societies, for the sake of US national
security. In other words, what we see is in these communications is the system-
atic construction of the case, couched in Kantian, Millean and Wilsonian lan-
guage, for armed intervention in first Afghanistan and then Iraq.
VI.1. Theme I: The presence of imminent danger from illiberal regimes and ideologies
The regimes of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as both their and Al Qaeda’s
ideologies are represented in these communications as the very anti-thesis of
civilisation and the civilised. They are commonly described, either directly or
indirectly, using very Millean language and concepts such as ‘barbaric’, ‘evil’,
‘brutal’ and ‘irrational’ and more significantly, as inherently violent. As Bush
states in his 2002 State of the Union address: “We have seen the depth of our en-
emies’ hatred in videos where they laugh about the loss of innocent life [my em-
phasis]. And the depth of their hatred is equalled by the madness of the
destruction they design [my emphasis]” (Bush 2002). At the same time, the idea
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that traditional mechanisms of engagement are useless against this new, innova-
tive and frighteningly irrational and destructive enemy is also clear in this dis-
course. For instance, the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy
states how “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist
enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of inno-
cents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent
protection is statelessness” (United States 2002). Vice President Dick Cheney
echoed these words when he asserted that a group like Al Qaeda “cannot be held
back by deterrence, nor reasoned with through diplomacy” (Cheney 2002). In
other words, countries and groups identified as enemies in the GWoT are
framed by the discourse, as peoples with whom alliance or negotiation is impos-
sible because, as Mill argues, alliances require reciprocity that barbarians, given
that they cannot be relied on to observe rules, are incapable of. Indeed, Bush un-
derscored this blatant flaunting of established norms and rules when he re-
minded us how Al Qaeda had, in targeting the civilian population of the United
States, directly violated “one of the principle norms of the law of warfare”
(United States 2002). Al Qaeda, its allies and the nations that support them are
thus framed as ‘unjust enemies’ in this discourse and this is underscored by con-
stant references to their deliberate targeting and brutalisation of both their own
people as well as international civilian populations (more on this below).
These groups and nations are also represented as posing a direct threat to US
national security given that they are engaged in plotting the destruction and
downfall of the ‘West’ in general, and of the United States, in particular. Hence
Bush argues, “We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and
public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons, sur-
veillance maps of American cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in
America and throughout the world” (idem). The shadowy nature of transna-
tional groups makes them all the more threatening because it challenges the
United States’ traditional military capabilities and undeniable technological su-
periority. President Bush underscores this evolving and acute threat to national
security when he asserts how “enemies in the past needed great armies and great
industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of indi-
viduals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to
purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and
to turn the power of modern technologies against us” (idem).
Some key words used in this discourse include repeated references to ‘evil’ -
indeed one could argue that this word is almost overused in communications
from this period. Several variations of ‘kill’ and ‘murder’ are also common.
Dangers, chaos and wars are constantly referred to and then given concrete form
through references to terrorists and terrorism, 9/11, Chemical, Biological, Ra-
diological and Nuclear Weapons (CBRNs) and Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMDs). These themes can be found repeatedly in statements, for example
Bush’s 2006 State of the Union address:
“Terrorists like bin Laden are serious about mass murder, and all of us must take
their declared intentions seriously. They seek to impose a heartless system of to-
talitarian control throughout the Middle East and arm themselves with weapons
of mass murder. Their aim is to seize power in Iraq and use it as a safe haven to
launch attacks against America and the world. Lacking the military strength to
challenge us directly, the terrorists have chosen the weapon of fear. When they
murder children at a school in Beslan or blow up commuters in London or be-
head a bound captive, the terrorists hope these horrors will break our will, allow-
ing the violent to inherit the Earth. But they have miscalculated: We love our
freedom, and we will fight to keep it” (Bush 2006).
Closely tied into this depiction of the terrorist ‘others’ is the logic that the
dangerous and illiberal regimes and ideologies associated with them must be
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dismantled/disarmed in order to prevent them from attacking and destroying the
Western way of life. Thus, a clear association is made between the non-state at-
tackers of 9/11 with what is, in essence, a state-based preventive response. Fur-
thermore, repeated references are made to states that either collude with radical
Islamists by proving safe havens, financial and military support or turn a blind
eye to these radical groups while simultaneously representing a threat in their
own right to the safety and wellbeing of the United States and its citizens. The
discourse also references the Kantian idea that these are repressive, non-repre-
sentative states, essentially controlled by regimes that violate citizen rights and
reject the basic principles of democracy. As such these states are framed as a
threat to the ‘pacific federation’ and so it becomes the United States’ responsi-
bility to neutralise the threat and preserve liberal values in the international sys-
tem. What is key to note here is the coalescing of multiple different threats into
one large threat, which the United States ignores at its own peril. The message is
clear: the United States must not shirk its liberal responsibilities but instead,
once again, fight for the freedoms, values and way of life of all civilised peo-
ples. In short, it must take military action to secure not only national and interna-
tional security but also human security.
“Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing Amer-
ica and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, ter-
ror, and mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist al-
lies, who would use them without the least hesitation. This threat is new.
America’s duty is familiar. Throughout the 20th century, small groups of men
seized control of great nations, built armies and arsenals, and set out to dominate
the weak and intimidate the world. In each case, their ambitions of cruelty and
murder had no limit. In each case, the ambitions of Hitlerism, militarism, and
communism were defeated by the will of free peoples, by the strength of great al-
liances, and by the might of the United States of America” (Bush 2003a).
VI.2. Theme II: U.S. responsibility to protect its citizens and its way of life
A second theme that emerges is the United States’ responsibility towards its
own citizens and way of life. The idea projected here is that of establishing a
system of security that cannot be breached. This not only references the Ameri-
can aim of strengthening internal security but also protecting the homeland by
‘taking the war to the enemy’ so that the ‘enemy does not come to our shores’.
This is very much in line with Freedman’s logic of the necessary, defensive war
that adopts offensive means and takes the fight to the enemy. More signifi-
cantly, once again it is about highlighting the particularly responsibility of the
US hegemon to secure national security, not by retreating within its own bor-
ders but by looking outward and guaranteeing its foreign policy interests in the
international system.
“In a time of testing, we cannot find security by abandoning our commitments
and retreating within our borders. If we were to leave these vicious attackers
alone, they would not leave us alone. They would simply move the battlefield to
our own shores. There is no peace in retreat, and there is no honor in retreat. By
allowing radical Islam to work its will, by leaving an assaulted world to fend for
itself, we would signal to all that we no longer believe in our own ideals or even
in our own courage. But our enemies and our friends can be certain: The United
States will not retreat from the world, and we will never surrender to evil” (Bush
2006).
The neoconservative assumption that becomes evident in this discourse is
that in the process of protecting its own citizens and acting in its own interests
the United States also serves the interests of the international system. For in-
stance, according to Condoleezza Rice, “America’s pursuit of the national inter-
est will create conditions that promote freedom, markets, and peace. Its pursuit
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of national interests after World War II led to a more prosperous and democratic
world. This can happen again” (Rice 2000). In other words, not only is the US
pursuit of its national interests legitimate, it is also virtuous (Monten 2005,
p. 148). This connection between national and international security as well as
the link between security and liberal values is repeatedly emphasised. For in-
stance, Bush stated, “I believe we have a responsibility to promote freedom that
is as solemn as the responsibility is to protecting the American people, because
the two go hand in hand” (George W. Bush as quoted in Desch 2007, p. 22).
Clearly evident in this logic is not only an assertion of the concept of the United
States as an agent of historical transformation and liberal change in the interna-
tional system but also democracy promotion as central to US political identity
and sense of national purpose. Thus, President Bush stated in 2005 that, “Amer-
ica’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one” (Bush 2005b).
Further woven into this sense of responsibility towards US citizens is the
theme of sacrifice for the honour and protection of the nation state. This is used
primarily in reference to the military and other service officials – such as the fire
fighters – involved in counter-terror operations and/or military interventions.
Also clearly underscored in this discourse is the incredible spectrum of risks
confronting the American nation – from biological and chemical weapon at-
tacks to more conventional terrorism.
“In the three and a half years since September the 11th, 2001, we have taken un-
precedented actions to protect Americans. We’ve created a new Department of
Government to defend our homeland, focused the FBI on preventing terrorism,
begun to reform our intelligence agencies, broken up terror cells across the coun-
try, expanded research on defenses against biological and chemical attack, im-
proved border security, and trained more than a half million first-responders.
Police and fire fighters, air marshals, researchers, and so many others are work-
ing every day to make our homeland safer” (Bush 2005a).
VI.3. Theme III: U.S. responsibility towards international security and its allies
A historic sense of leadership comes through very clearly in the discourse of
the GWoT that consistently underscores that this leadership role entails that the
United States help maintain security for its allies and friends. Implicit in this his-
torical responsibility of democracy promotion is a normative sense of rightness,
superiority, confidence as well as the “assumption that democracy is a universal
system” (Monten 2005, p. 145). Thus, Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy
asserted how American power could be used to create “conditions in which all
nations and societies can chose for themselves the rewards and challenges of
political and economic liberty” (United States 2002). He also stated in 2006
how:
“America rejects the false comfort of isolationism. We are the nation that saved
liberty in Europe and liberated death camps and helped raise up democracies and
faced down an evil empire. Once again, we accept the call of history to deliver
the oppressed and move this world toward peace” (Bush 2006).
This notion that the United States was acting on behalf of not only national
but also international interests is, as highlighted above, repeatedly alluded to in
the discourse. However, the discourse does not stop at making the connection
between national and international security and between security and liberal
values. Instead it develops this idea into a full-fledged national responsibility to
defend the reputation and credibility of international allies and organisations,
with the use of military force if necessary. For instance, a number of decision
makers believed that it was imperative that the US rises up to the challenge of
defending the “credibility of the United Nations” (Monten 2005, p. 148). Rice
argued in 2003 with reference to Saddam Hussein and the weapons of mass de-
‘Defensive Liberal Wars’: The Global War on Terror and the Return of Illiberalism in American Foreign Policy 113
struction inspections process, “It isn’t American credibility on the line, it is the
credibility of everybody that this gangster can yet again beat the international
system” and in allowing Iraq “to play volleyball with the international commu-
nity this way will come back to haunt us someday. That is the reason [to invade]
[...] Iraq is critical to re-establishing the bona fides of the Security Council”
(Condoleezza Rice as quoted in Monten 2005, p. 148)31. But the idea of defend-
ing credibility did not apply to international allies alone - the same ideals held
true for the United States as well. Thus, credibility was the very foundation
upon which the spread of liberal values rested. The logic was that the US dis-
course of promoting its political values in the international system had to be
backed by a willing and demonstrable use of its material power to implement
this liberal change when necessary. Thus as Rice stated in 2004, “president
Bush’s foreign policy is a bold new vision that draws inspiration from the ideas
that have guided American foreign policy at its best: That democracies must
never lack the will or the means to meet and defeat freedom’s enemies, that
America’s power and purpose must be used to defend freedom, and that the
spread of democracy leads to lasting peace” (Rice 2004). In other words, the US
had to have the will to put its money where its mouth was. This was more than
evident in the manner that the WMD-related concessions by Libya were con-
strued as the outcome of a post-Iraq renewal of US credibility in the interna-
tional system. Bush essentially underscored this stance in his 2004 State of the
Union address, when he stated: “nine months of intense negotiations succeeded
with Libya, while twelve years of diplomacy with Iraq did not [...]. Words must
be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of America” (George W. Bush
as quoted in Monten 2005, p. 148).
Closely tied into this idea of responsibility was America’s self-image as a
hegemon and a beacon of hope, freedom and liberal values. Hence, as Bush as-
serted, “I believe that the United States is the beacon for freedom in the world”
(George W. Bush as quoted in Desch 2007, p. 22). These liberal values and free-
doms are necessary to lead the ‘pacific federation’ by setting an example that
can be emulated by its allies and imposed forcibly if necessary upon other,
non-liberal nations – of course, for their own good. This is very clearly in the
Millean vein of ‘barbarians’ having “no rights as a nation, except a right to such
treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one”. In
other words, America’s responsibility lay not only in securing national and in-
ternational security but also in creating a new liberal, democratic world order
(Mill as quoted in Jahn 2005a, p. 605).
“But America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human
dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; pri-
vate property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance. America will
take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the
world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective than
eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful
world beyond the war on terror” (Bush 2002).
Constant references are made to this union of like-minded states and allies –
words used here are coalition, allies and these are presented as upholding liberal
values – respecting individual rights and freedoms – as opposed to the barbaric,
brutal and oppressive regimes that they are opposing. Clearly Millean language
is used as alliances are framed as being composed of like-minded, i.e. ‘civil-
ised’, nations.
“In this moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing old rivalries. Amer-
ica is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never before, to
achieve peace and prosperity. In every region, free markets and free trade and
free societies are proving their power to lift lives. Together with friends and al-
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31 Monten rightly points out
that in assuming for the UN
the defence of its credibility,
the US empowered itself to
“pursue those interests at its
unilateral discretion, not
constrained by the withholding
of consent by the organization
itself”.
lies from Europe to Asia and Africa to Latin America, we will demonstrate that
the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of freedom” (idem).
Moreover, as the United States defends and extends liberal values in the in-
ternational system these allies also come to include non-Western nations such
as Afghanistan whose new leaders, in stark contrast to the barbarian ‘other’ (i.e.
the Taliban), crave the establishment of democratic governments and institu-
tions. Here while the United States adopted a clearly paternalistic stance, in that
as world hegemon it accepted the burden of ‘civilising’ these nations, there are
also clear references made to post-intervention, self-reliance and self-gover-
nance. Therefore, the overall tone is hegemonic but not necessarily imperialis-
tic.
“The American flag flies again over our Embassy in Kabul. Terrorists who once
occupied Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay. And terrorist lead-
ers who urged followers to sacrifice their lives are running for their own. Amer-
ica and Afghanistan are now allies against terror. We’ll be partners in rebuilding
that country” (idem).
VI.4. Theme IV: U.S. responsibility towards oppressed and brutalised people struggling to survive under illiberal
regimes and ideologies
The key words that are used here include ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ as brought
to people suffering under the yoke of oppression and under authoritarian re-
gimes. The stress in this theme is upon civil liberties and issues such as
women’s rights. It is interesting to note how, for instance, the Taliban’s denial
of women’s right to education, political representation etc. is used to depict such
groups as uncivilised, barbaric, backwards and illiberal and therefore necessi-
tating intervention and removal. Thus, the successful securitisation of the ter-
rorist threat along with the challenges it posed to the freedom and liberty of
individuals, who lived in regions governed/controlled by these organisations,
facilitated the recourse to military intervention that was founded on a clearly
liberal logic of protecting the weak and helpless while simultaneously protect-
ing the ‘pacific federation’.
“The last time we met in this Chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghani-
stan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to
school. Today women are free and are part of Afghanistan’s new Government.
Our progress is a tribute to the spirit of the Afghan people, to the resolve of our
coalition, and to the might of the United States military” (idem).
The sense that the United States would use military might for the benefit of
the common man and for the democratic cause is repeated again and again in the
discourse. In direct contrast to the empirical realities of ‘collateral damage’ in
the GWoT, the discourse always emphasises the fact that aim of US military ac-
tion is to target the oppressive regimes of Afghanistan and Iraq and not its
‘starving’, ‘suffering’, ‘tyrannised’ people:
“At the same time [as the US military conducts strikes against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban regime], the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity
of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we will also drop food,
medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children
of Afghanistan” (Bush 2001b).
“Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a
message for them. If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed
against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you. As our coali-
tion takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We
will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a new Iraq
that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggres-
sion against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dis-
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sidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone.
The day of your liberation is near” (Bush 2003b).
What comes across quite clearly in this discourse is the United State’s sense
of virtuousness. This logic essentially builds upon the ideas mentioned previ-
ously, i.e. first, that liberal values and democracy are universal and can thus find
expression in US foreign policy and second, that the United States’ efforts to se-
cure its national interests also benefits the oppressed populations of the world.
As Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz stated, “Democracy is a uni-
versal idea and [...] letting people rule themselves happens to be something that
serves Americans and America’s interests as well” (Paul Wolfowitz as quoted
in Desch 2007, p. 22). Also clearly evident in this discourse is the fact that the
promotion of democracy was seen as significantly more important for US pol-
icy than stability. For instance, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld dis-
missed the looting and disorder in Iraq after the 2003 US invasion by declaring,
“Freedom is untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit
crimes and do bad things. They are also free to live their lives and do wonderful
things” (Donald Rumsfeld as quoted in Desch 2007, p. 24). Desch rightly points
out that had the neoconservatives been interested in no more than a pro-US re-
gime in Baghdad they would have been content to replace Saddam Hussein with
a more amenable dictator rather than pushing for a democratically elected gov-
ernment, especially given both the commitment and turmoil that the later en-
tailed. In fact, Wolfowitz even stated before the Iraq war commenced that the
United States was “not interested in replacing one dictator with another” (Paul
Wolfowitz as quoted in Desch 2007, p. 24). Thus instability was seen as part and
parcel of the long march towards freedom and democracy.
VII. Conclusions
This paper analysed the neoconservative practices and discourse of the
Global War on Terror (GWoT) as seen in the statements made by George W.
Bush and other key members of his administrations. I began by illustrating how
the political roots of what can be best terms as the United States’ recent turn to
illiberal policy can in fact be traced to the philosophical thoughts of Immanuel
Kant and John Stuart Mill. Indeed, the language and the logic behind the
‘othering’ and eventual securitisation of Al Qaeda/transnational terrorism and
its allies are clearly rooted in both the language and ideas of Kant and Mill. I
also highlighted that the tendency to adopt illiberal means to achieve ostensibly
liberal ends is not a uniquely neoconservative trait. Instead it can be clearly lo-
cated in American foreign policy since at least the beginning of the 20th century.
Thus, by framing Salafi-Jihadism as an exceptional act and as such a key exis-
tential threat to not only the United States’ national security but also to the
‘civilised world’ and international and human security in general, the United
States was able to frame its response as necessary war waged in defence of lib-
eral freedoms and values. It was upon this logic that the interventions and pro-
jects of democracy promotion in Afghanistan and Iraq were predicated. These
elements of the discourse and practice of the GWoT were demonstrated through
a thematic analysis of key statements made by President Bush and other key
personnel in his administration.
Of course, there were certain assumptions underpinning this stance, includ-
ing the notion that liberalism and democracy are universal values as well as the
belief that the United States was, as the world’s sole superpower, best placed to
defend these values. This in turn was predicated upon the deeply held political
belief that in securing its national interests the United States would, as before,
also be enhancing international security. There is no doubt that implicit in de-
mocracy promotion was a strategic (some would argue even imperialistic) im-
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perative, however there was also a historically rooted, normative sense of
rightness and superiority evident in the discourse. In other words, it was upon
both the material and the normative that America’s sense of self-identity was
predicated. What this meant was that that this particular self-perception deeply
impacted how the United States’ measured its success or failure against the
threat posed by the Al Qaeda ‘other’. Hence, the various aims under the GWoT
– from controlling WMDs and protecting the American homeland to neutralis-
ing so-called rogue regimes and restricting the geographical reach of Al Qaeda
to defeating it in the battle of arms and ideas - all depended upon the successful
projection of US power, in the service of democracy promotion, in the interna-
tional system. This is because it was through the establishment of democratic in-
stitutions and the protection of liberal freedoms and values that all these aims
could be achieved. That the United States was willing to use armed intervention
to achieve this end not only reflected its attempts to secure its position of un-
matched advantage as the world’s sole superpower but also its unique under-
standing of its exceptional position, rights and responsibilities in the post-Cold
War world order.
The fact the United States was willing to use what were essentially illiberal
means to achieve what were liberal ends reflects the deep paradox inherent in
liberalism. Indeed one could argue that it is at the very intersection of strategic
imperatives and self-perception that the shift to illiberalism occurred under the
GWoT. Thus, it was the successful securitisation of Al Qaeda and rogue re-
gimes immediately after the 9/11 attacks that first pushed the United States to-
wards defending its way of life and the liberal values and freedoms of the
international system. In other words, it was in the process of attempting to guar-
antee both its own national security while simultaneously also fulfilling its role
as hegemon, that it moved inexorably towards the adoption of illiberal policies.
Internally these policies and practices were epitomised in the implementation
and re-ratification of the PATRIOT act and progressively more significant re-
strictions on civil liberties in the name of national security. Externally, these il-
liberal practices were best seen in the flouting of established international
norms governing the laws of war and the progressive erosion of human rights
via policies of extraordinary rendition, incarceration and torture. Thus, one can
argue that, the excesses of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo were made possible be-
cause of the paradox inherent in liberalism – where illiberal means became ac-
ceptable in order to achieve liberal ends. The United States, as the perpetrator of
these crimes was a liberal actor, indeed it was the ‘beacon of freedom’ and ‘the
defender of liberal values and opportunity’. But it was the deeply rooted liberal
tradition within in the United States that pushed it towards viewing the threat
from Al Qaeda in an alarmist, existential light and thus towards adopting what
was an illiberal, unrestrained policy response. Thus, in viewing itself as ‘excep-
tional’ the United States not only moved towards a pre-emptive unilateralism
but also in the course of the GWoT well beyond the pale of established interna-
tional laws and regulations. In short, the unfortunate developments over the past
fourteen years have essentially brought to light what authors like Louis Hartz
argued had always rested at the very heart of US liberalism: its “intolerance –
verging on hysteria – in the face of non-liberal ideas and institutions” (Hartz
1955).
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Resumo
Este trabalho apresenta uma análise das práticas e discursos iliberais da Guerra Global Contra o Terror (GWoT, na sigla em inglês) e
demonstra como os Estados Unidos da América usaram o argumento liberal como uma métrica qualitativa do seu sucesso e fracasso
na GWoT. Argumento que o “estranhamento do outro” (salafistas jihadistas) – bem como o envolvimento militar no Afeganistão e
Iraque foram filosoficamente enraizadas no pensamento liberal de Immanuel Kant e John Stuart Mill, que tradicionalmente têm
guiado a política externa estadunidense. Mais significativamente, essas filosofias liberais da história e das relações internacionais têm
dentro de si as sementes do iliberalismo ao descrever sociedades/organizações não-liberais e antidemocráticas como “bárbaras” – e,
como tal, os principais candidatos para a intervenção e mudança de regime. Predicado nessa lógica, o discurso da GWoT enquadrou
a Al Qaeda como uma ameaça existencial chave, não apenas para os Estados Unidos, mas também para o “mundo civilizado” em
geral, exigindo então uma “guerra defensiva liberal” em resposta. Foi o sucesso da securitização da Al Qaeda que essencialmente
permitiu aos Estados Unidos adotarem políticas profundamente iliberais para combater esta dita ameaça existencial utilizando-se de
todos os meios à sua disposição
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